FusiOrari

Since his ascent as Leader of the Revolution in 1979, ayatollah Khomeini has often been labelled as a “fundamentalist”. The idea is so rooted in the collective imagination, to deserve the creation of a specific farsi term, bonyadegar. Notwithstanding the wide usage of both terms, bonyadegar and fundamentalist, we can affirm that in this case language does not reflect reality. Far from being an expression of the famigerate Islamic fundamentalism that has recently hit the headlines, the elaborate khomeinist ideology represented, and still represents, a clean break with the past. Let's explore the reason.

PLEASE DON'T CALL ME “FUNDAMENTALIST” - The term “fundamentalism” was coined between XIX and XX century to indicate a new current born within the American Protestant Church in contrast with the liberal and modernist thought of the time. Then, the term entered the common language to indicate an attitude of rigid and uncompromising implementation of the principles of faith, known as “fundamentals”. In the Islamic world, this means a strict adherence to Koran literal translation and a strong emphasis on the necessity of a return to Islam Golden Age, the strongly idealized period which coincided with the lives of Muhammad and the four “righly-guided” caliphs (622-661 A.D.). Taken in its original context, “fundamentalism” represented a mechanism of defence adopted by the Protestant Church against those “reformist preachers” who were talking about the potential of religion as a means for social change. Far from being a conservative reaction to liberalism, khomeinist ideology was imbued with political and social appeals to the Iranian masses. By intentionally avoiding quibbling doctrinal minutiae, Khomeini focused on the everyday needs of the Iranians, especially the need for a revolution in order to kick out “western imperialists” and to redeem the disinherited and the have-nots. Paradoxically, even the appeal to the necessity of a return to Islam Golden Age is a by-product of modernity. When Islam met modernity, the recall to a strong idealized period became the means through which traditions and identities could be saved by corruption and alienation. In a context of strong political and social disorders brought in by “the West”, Muhammad's Medina became a sort of Augustinian City of God, a model to lean towards in order to preserve each one's faith and identity.

REINVENTING TRADITION – In addition to not calling for a return to Islam Golden Age, Khomeini broke with past and tradition; in order to do this, he resorted to one of the most powerful means of mobilization: religion. Having as final aim the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the ayatollah formulated a reinterpretation of Shiism and a reinvention of tradition so as to pave the way for the clergy's politicization and to the abolition of the old quietist principle of taqiyya. Quietism and activism stopped to be two distinct sides of the same Shiite coin; since then on, there would have been room only for one side: the activist one. In Khomeini's view, in order to perform true Islam the oppressed had to revolt against the oppressor, since being idle equalled betraying Islam. In his reinterpretation, Khomeini affirmed that the time had come for Shia clergy to stop being mere repository of tradition: it was time to fight. Another cornerstone of Shiism reinterpreted by Khomeini in order to support his political theory, is the Shiite perception of being “the right few” in a world dominated by an implicitly illegitimate majority. Two corollaries followed from this postulate. First, the weak is the just, while the strong is the unjust. As a consequence, it is necessary to give a lesson of humility to superpowers – the strongest among the strong. Second, since the rules of the international game are dictated by superpowers, it is permitted to Iran to break those rules. Another Shiite conviction, which pairs up with “the right few” belief, is the persuasion of being oppressed by an iniquitous and illegitimate government. This persuasion dates back to the early days of Shiism, when the throne that was thought to be a right of Muhammad and Ali's descendants was usurped by Omayyads, Abbasids and other dinasties till the advent of the hateful Pahlavis, whose policy of forced secularization represented the most dangerous threat to Shiism. In his incitement to revolt, Khomeini promised to the oppressed and the disinherited Iranians thet the new Islamic government “would have brought down the mighty from their thrones and would have lifted up the humble”. By borrowing the typical zoroastrian dychotomies, Shiism became the fight of the oppressed against the oppressor and the revenge of the humble against the mighty. In his personal elaboration of a sort of Liberation Theology, the ayatollah recalled the marxist concepts of exploitation of the proletariat and class conflict. Anyway, this last concept has been used by Khomeini more to distance himself from Marxism than to espouse it. The ayatollah in fact exhorted the masses to stop fighting in order to establish a spiritual community regardless of the differences among different segments of society. This idea, as utopian as the marxist one, allowed Khomeini to win the hearts and minds of those Iranians who, despite being attracted by Marxism, could not repudiate their Islamic faith.

MARTYRS, HOLY WARS AND KEYS TO PARADISE: FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS? - The last article of faith reinterpreted by Khomeini is the perception of the human nature as implicitly weak and corruptible. According to Shiite doctrine, human beings – with the exception of imam and ulama – are weak, fallible and prone to fall into temptation. Khomeini ascribed human fragility to the egoistic need to satisfy material needs. Two consequences follow: first, superpowers are responsible for the diffusion of mundane desires; second, in order to purify his soul, man has to embark on a path of ascesis and spiritual elevation. The invitation to transcendence is then taken to extremes: in order to reach the maximum spiritual purification, man has to renounce to his earthly life; in order to resist temptation, man is called to the extreme sacrifice, martyrdom. In Shiite tradition, there is no trace of this link between ascesis and martyrdom; on the contrary, ascesis has always been linked to quietism. The concept of martyrdom is common to both Islamic shahid and Christian martyrem, meaning “witness”. Anyway, in Sunni Islam shahid is the man who gives is life while fighting jihad, while in the Christian world martyrem is the man who consciously faces death instead of abjuring his faith. Khomeini once again went beyond the traditional interpretation, by encouraging Shiites to remember Husayn's martyrdom not only by taking part in Muharram celebrations, but also by giving their own lives. While traditional Islam asks his believers to give their life only if necessary, Khomeini asked Iranians to actively use martyrdom as a weapon to defend their faith – and their country. To pay for this last, creative reinterpretation of Shiism were the mothers and families of young Iranian shahid sent to the Iraqi front in the long war of 1980-1988. These child soldiers were then used as cannon fodder in the desperate attempt to break the Iraqi defenses: no weapons in their arms, but a pair of made in Taiwan keys to heaven around their necks. Where are they now? Heaven? Hell? Nowhere? Impossible for us to tell. What we should do today is try to understand if that activist rethoric is still alive and capable of recruiting soldiers for the eternal battle of Good against Evil. But who stands on “the Good's” side now that the once oppressed Shiite clergy has become the new oppressor? As in all battles, there are no winners on the horizon; only little yellow plastic keys to heaven tolling mercy's death.

Read the first part: Pre-islamic identity and the encounter with shiism

Read the second part: Knocking on the mosque door

Read the fourth part: Is it possible to get out of an Islamic revolution? New intellectuals and old questions