FusiOrari

Welcome to the second stop on our journey in the charming country of colorful mosques and austere mountains, boundless plains and tortuous bazars. In order to get to the heart of the iranian paradox, we have to understand the main division which affects the islamic umma: the difference between Shia and Sunni Islam. Far from being only a religious matter, this distinction influences the shaping of identities and the perception of the external world. As first, we will investigate the bone of contention; then we will meet the venerable Imams which populate Shia imagination and, finally, we will make the acquaintance of those mysterious turbaned men whose stern look normally generates fear rather than thirst for knowledge. But remember: you can't judge a book by its cover and a man by its turban...

“PRINCE OF MARTYRS” - The division between Shia and Sunni Islam dates back to the decades following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 a.d. Since Muhammad died without nominating an heir, the successor was chosen by the Medinian community according to the principle of consultation. From 632 to 661, four “rightly-guided caliphs” (al-khulafa rashidun) took over the leadership of the Muslim world. Their names were Abu Bakr, whose caliphate lasted from 632 to 634, Umar (634-644), Uthman (644-656) and Ali (656-661). Following the election of Ali – cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad – the upholders of the Umayya clan – the clan of Uthman – left Medina and went to Damascus. The murder of Ali in 661 marked the end of the period of the “rightly guided caliphs” and the beginning of the Umayyad caliphate. In order to dethrone the umayyad usurpers, al Hosayn – Ali's second-born – left Mecca to go to Kufa, in today's Iraq, and join the rebel tribes who were fighting against the umayyads. In what became known as “the battle of Kerbala”, which took place on muharram 10 (ashura), in the year 61 of the Islamic calendar (october 10, 680), Hosayn and his supporters were brutally killed by the large military detachement of the Umayyad caliph. Since then, Hosayn has been given the title of “Prince of martyrs”: the man who consciously faced death in order to give a strong signal to the entire world. Every year, on the day of ashura, Shiites commemorate Hosayn's Passion by beating their breasts and by administering themselves corporal punishment. Hosayn's final sacrifice helped crystallize the division between Sunnis and Shiites: the former are followers of the tradition (sunna) and think that the leader of the islamic community should be elected by those capable of the job, as happened with the four “rightly-guided”; the latter believe that leadership should stay within the Prophet's own family, beginning from Ali. Actually, in Ali's example of devotion, zeal and sacrifice Shiites recognize the model of the perfect Muslim.

WAITING FOR THE MESSIAH TO COME - Differently from what happens in Sunni Islam, Shiites only recognize as legitimate leaders Muhammad's descendants. Thus, beginning from Ali, Shiites venerate a certain number of leaders (imam), who are commonly thought to be superior to human beings; they are not only the leaders of the community, but also the living proof (hujja) of the revealed truth. Imams are infallible beings whose authority comes directly from the divine grace ('ilm) that pervades them and keeps them free from error and sin. Shia Islam is divided in different branches, the largest of which is the Twelver Shia; “twelvers” believe in twelve Imams, the last of which – the mahdi – is believed to be in occultation (ghaybah). When the eleventh Imam al-Hasan died in 874 without leaving a successor, a difficult period, that shiite historians call al-hayra, “confusion”, laid ahead. In order to come out of the crisis, the voice was spread that Hasan actually had a child, Muhammad, but that he was kept hidden (taqiyya) in order to be protected from the sinister designs of the caliph. The belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam deeply affected Shiite eschatology: according to tradition, mahdi's reappearance will be preceded by terrible plagues and devastations, but in the end a big storm will clean the Earth and rid it of sins and vices; on muharram 10, the mahdi will reappear in the sacred mosque of Mecca and will free Shiites from oppression and injustice; the resurrection of the dead on Judgment day will follow. Another practice whose origin derives from the belief in the concealment of the Twelfth Imam is the practice of “dissimulation” (taqiyya). Under certain circumstances, like threat and persecution, Shiites are permitted to hide their loyalty to the mahdi and their belonging to Shia Islam. Even though Sunni Islam allows the practice of dissimulation too, taqiyya is generally linked to the Shiite community due to the harsh persecutions of which it has constantly been object. If we look at the Iranian revolution of 1979 from this point of view, it is easy to understand why it has not been a revolution for the restoration of Shiite tradition, but a revolution against that tradition; centuries of quietist tradition have been swept away from a new incitement ro rebellion and political activism that finds his model in Hosayn's martyrdom.

WHO WANTS TO BE AN AYATOLLAH? - Well, who is to be given the execution of mahdi's duties during the time of his concealment? Till the accession to the throne of the Qajar dinasty (1796) it was commonly thought that during the time of the imam's concelament all his duties should have been suspended, since they were his exclusive prerogative. However, due to sheer necessity, from Qajars on the execution of imam's duties was given to the ulama – the educated scholars of islamic law -. Ulama were given the prerogative to collect religious taxes, to conduct Friday's sermon – which gave them the possibility to give the crowd political orientations -, to inflict corporal punishment and to declare Holy War against the infidels. But what do you have to do if you want to join this powerful and exclusive class of legal scholars? Shia clerics are trained in Islamic seminaries (hawza) under the guidance of erudite ulama; they study Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), Prophet's sayings (hadith), Quranic exegesis, Arab philosophy, language and literature and, last but not least, the procedure of dialectic reasoning (kalam) which will enable them to perform ijtihad, that is the making of a decision by personal effort of interpretation of religious texts. At the end of this first course of lectures, students are given the title of hujjat-al-Islam (“proof of Islam”). After years of studying, teaching, writing and preaching, hujjat-al-Islam can become ayatollah (“sign of God”). Once the cleric has gathered a critical mass of followers who regard him as a marja'-i taqlid (“source of emulation”), he is given the title of ayatollah uzma (“great sign of God”). Each marja', responding to his followers' questions, formulates his own interpretation of the islamic legal texts; this is the reason why in Shia Islam we can't talk of a single point of view, but rather of a plurality of orientations. Let's consider for example the difference of opinion between hardline ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi and moderate ayatollah uzma Yusuf Sanei. The first, who is regarded as the éminence grise behind President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, sides with nuclear weapons, violence and repression, while condemning democratic practices such as elections; the latter calls for the establishment of a government respectful of human rights and religious creeds as well as the instauration of a “dialogue among civilizations” as an answer to all those prophets of doom who see in the religious element the source of new and devastating conflicts.

Read the first part: Pre-islamic identity and the encounter with shiism

Read the third part: Fundamentally, a non-fundamentalist revolution

Read the fourth part: Is it possible to get out of an Islamic revolution? New intellectuals and old questions